VIEWPOINT DIVERSITY AND DISCRIMINATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

"We [American colleges and universities] champion tolerance, except for conservatives and evangelical Christians. We want to be inclusive of people who don't look like us—so long as they think like us."
—*New York Times* journalist Nicholas Kristof (2016a)

Higher education leads the way in working toward a more diverse, representative, welcoming, and supportive environment that increases inclusiveness, promotes greater equity, and enriches the learning experience by creating an atmosphere where all community members can flourish in an open marketplace of ideas, opinions, and beliefs (Haidt et al., 2015; King, Jr., Mitchell, McIntosh, & Bell-Ellwanger, 2016). Pluralism is a well-established value in the academy, and it enjoys broad backing—except for individuals who do not share the overwhelming liberal political bias in higher education. In support of this position Kristof (2016b) cited Dr. George Yancey, a black, evangelical Christian sociology professor at the University of North Texas, who said "Outside of academia I faced more problems as a black. But inside academia, I face more problems as a Christian, and it is not even close." While this quote suggests, unsurprisingly, that higher education may be unwelcoming to religion, particularly Christianity (Larson, 2010), the more important point is that higher education seems to have created an intellectual monoculture in many disciplines (Etchemendy, 2017) that are unreceptive to those with viewpoints, understandings, ideologies, and political beliefs not endorsed by the political left.[1] Even having ideas thought to be inconsistent with a person's ethnicity can be problematic. French (2016), for example, noted that affirmative action was less robust for African-Americans and Hispanics who held notions seemingly incompatible with their ethnicity:

> there are times when admissions committees will ideologically cleanse the minority applicant pool of minorities who are seen as 'less diverse' because of expressed interest in 'white' professions such as, say, investment banking. If you're a Mexican American who writes an admissions essay about defending the rights of migrant farm workers, you're a dream candidate. If you're a black candidate who aspires to work for Goldman Sachs, you're 'less diverse.'

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[1] Throughout this paper, we use the terms conservative, right-wing, and Republican as synonyms. Likewise, liberal, left-wing, and Democratic are represented as alternative expressions. Since the early 20th century, the Democratic Party has been the left-leaning party, and the Republican Party has been the right-leaning party (Levendusky 2009). We recognize that there are degrees of political affiliation but feel that this bifurcation is most helpful in discussing political viewpoints and viewpoint diversity.

These scenarios suggest that thinking differently or challenging the liberal hegemony in today's academy may have problematic consequences for those whose interpretations and political ideology can be classified as non-liberal, specifically conservative.[2] We define political ideology as the set of attitudes, which contain cognitive, affective, and motivational components, that explains how society should function to achieve social justice and social order (Jost, 2006). Since the 1800s, the left-right distinction has been used to describe differences in political ideology, which originated from the way the French parliament was seated (Bobbio, 1996). While abstract, this differentiation has been classified as the most parsimonious and useful way to characterize political views and has proven useful in virtually all cultural contexts (Jost, 2006), and represents the most compelling and predictive approach for arraying ideologies (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Knight, 2006; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984; Schwartz, 1996). In the United States, conservatives emphasize personal responsibility and empowerment of the individual to solve problems, limited government, transcendent religious beliefs, fairness defined by equity, free markets, property rights, and individualism (Detomasi, 2008; Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012; Tetlock, 2000). In contrast, liberals tend to emphasize the duty of the government to alleviate social ills, protect civil liberties, individual rights and human rights, secular beliefs that oppose the Judeo-Christian tradition, fairness defined by equality, concern for the environment, and a preference for egalitarianism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Schlenker et al., 2012; Schwartz, 1996). Humor columnist and provocateur, Dave Barry, suggests that Republicans (conservatives) think of Democrats (liberals) as godless, unpatriotic, elitists, while Democrats view Republicans as ignorant, NASCAR-obsessed, gun-fondling religious fanatics.

This paper examines how these differences in liberal and conservative worldviews play out in higher education within the context of viewpoint diversity. We do this by first by scrutinizing various diversity dimensions followed by a discussion of viewpoint diversity. We then present data on the numbers of liberals and conservatives in the professoriate and then consider the consequences of such an imbalance. Finally, we offer recommendations for addressing the overwhelmingly liberal bent in the academy followed by a conclusion and summary.

DIVERSITY

Support for diversity (the multitude of individual differences that make people unique and different from others, Kreitner & Kinicki, 2010; often discussed using such terms as inclusion, pluralism, equity, cultural diversity, multiculturalism) in higher education is practically a universal value and is consistent with its significance in other domains. For example, biologists indicate that the greater the genetic diversity within a species, the greater the species' chances of long-term survival (e.g., Frankham, 2005); financial planners and investment counselors communicate the

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[2] Moving beyond the academy, Holmes (2016) noted that liberalism in America today has abandoned the precepts of open-mindedness and respect for individual rights, liberties, and the rule of law upon which the country was founded, and becoming instead an intolerant, rigidly dogmatic ideology that abhors dissent and stifles free speech. Holmes argues that today's liberalism has forsaken its American roots, incorporating instead the authoritarian, anti-clerical, and anti-capitalist prejudices of the radical and largely European Left resulting in a closing of the American liberal mind.

value of having a diversified portfolio (e.g., Goetzmann & Kumar, 2008); organization scholars point out that workplace pluralism helps members address questions and issues from different angles leading to better group problem solving and greater success in completing tasks (e.g., Phillips, Liljenquist, & Neale, 2009); and governmental agencies at the local, state, and federal levels emphasize diversity with numerous equal employment opportunity regulations and initiatives advocating the appreciation of differences across numerous factors (e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, n. d.).

Kreitner and Kinicki (2010) identified four levels of individual differences that are often addressed in diversity discussions (see Figure 1). This figure illustrates that people fundamentally differ in their personalities. They also are unlike in demographic features, referred to as surface-level dimensions that are often addressed by governmental entities in cases of discrimination and that are not under an individual's control. Additionally, distinctions occur in socioeconomic (external) factors where persons have significant influence. The outer layer lists several areas that typically address organizational and institutional variances.

Figure 1. Layers of diversity. Adapted from Kreitner & Kinicki, 2010, p. 36.

As can be seen in Figure 1, viewpoint diversity, specifically political viewpoint diversity, has not been included in traditional pluralism conversations. Unlike race, gender, age, and many other dimensions where attitudes and behaviors towards individuals become constrained by social norms (Himmelfarb & Lickteig, 1982; Maccoby & Maccoby, 1954; Sigall & Page, 1971), there are relatively few similar pressures to mitigate disapproval of those with different political viewpoints and beliefs. Because liberals tend to dominate today's academy in many areas of higher education (Jaschik, 2017) partisans commonly feel free to express animus and engage in

discriminatory behavior toward those with opposing ideological views (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014). This should not be surprising since similarity attracts (the "birds of a feather" effect) is one of the most well-established findings in social psychology (Byrne, 1969). In classic research by Rokeach (1960), participants rated their impressions of target persons whose race and opinions on issues were either the same as or different from the participants' own. Rokeach found that differences in opinions were more important than racial differences in determining liking for the targets; participants preferred targets with similar opinions over targets with dissimilar opinions, regardless of the targets' race. Iyengar and Westwood (2015) likewise found that compared with the most salient social divide in American society—race—political viewpoint diversity elicits more extreme evaluations and behavioral responses to ingroups and outgroups. Indeed, many progressive faculty members may be antagonistic not only to conservatives but also to ideas and studies that challenge liberal views or advance conservative ones. A further discussion of viewpoint diversity is now warranted.

VIEWPOINT DIVERSITY

The First Amendment (addressing freedom of speech) is first, not only because it is listed first in the amendments, but instead because it articulates the first freedom and the nature of that free expression. It guarantees the liberty essential to humans as rational beings and the maintenance of a democratic government. The Supreme Court in *National Citizens Committee/or Broadcasting* (1978) affirmed that the First Amendment seeks diversity of "viewpoint" (p. 797). Such free speech protections promote a multiplicity of ideas and encourage people with a variety of perspectives to speak out and participate in American life. Viewpoint diversity involves an honest consideration of multiple, often competing for claims that privileges a vigorous and spirited debate of ideologically different ideas which are to be judged on their logical soundness and intellectual merit. In the case of *Street v. New York* (1969), the Court affirmed that "the constitutionally guaranteed 'freedom to be intellectually ... diverse or even contrary,' and the 'right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order,' encompass the freedom to express publicly one's opinions which are defiant or contemptuous" (p. 121). Similarly, according to Justice William Brennan, speaking for the majority in *Texas v. Johnson* (1989) indicated: "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable . . ." (p. 414). Additionally, in *Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association* (1983) the Supreme Court all but ruled that viewpoint discrimination is never permitted under the free speech clause. Thus, the First Amendment is needed to protect minority viewpoints, unpopular viewpoints, and viewpoints that people despise or would prefer to eliminate from academic or public discourse. Speech that enjoys widespread support does not need any protection.

To illustrate the importance of viewpoint diversity, consider that Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have strongly encouraged viewpoint diversity in the media, not by directly mandating content, but by limiting concentration of media ownership which is seen as a means to the ultimate end of furthering substantive viewpoint diversity (Ho & Quinn, 2009), and in turn fostering broad democratic goals of an informed citizenry, deliberation, and accountability (Baker, 2005). "In limiting broadcast ownership to promote economic competition,

we also take major strides toward protecting and promoting our separate policy goal of protecting competition in the marketplace of ideas—viewpoint diversity" (Federal Communications Commission, 2003, p. 13,639). Some media rules and regulations have been promulgated to further viewpoint diversity and to avoid convergence:

- *The "broadcast-newspaper cross-ownership" rule, promulgated in 1975, restricts common ownership of a newspaper and broadcast station (television or radio) in the same market (Federal Trade Commission, 2003);*
- *The "television-radio cross-ownership" rule limits the number of television and radio stations an entity may own in a single market (Baker, 2005);*
- *The "national television ownership" rule caps the aggregate television audience any single entity may reach 39% (Federal Communications Commission, 2007);*
- *The "dual network" rule prohibits a merger between any of the top four networks (i.e., ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC; 47 C.F.R., 2008); and*
- *From 1970 to 1995, the "financial interest and syndication" rules barred television networks from having a financial stake in syndication of programs (Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004).*

The existence of viewpoint pluralism on societal conditions nurtures minority perspectives (Bork, 1971) and is beneficial because it motivates majority members to think more deeply about the issues at stake (Crano, 2012; Duarte et al., 2015), and "enhances the national debate" (Marshall, 1986, p. 70). There is even evidence that politically diverse teams produce more creative solutions than politically homogeneous teams about problems including "how can a person of average talent achieve fame" and how to find funding for a partially-built church ineligible for bank loans (Triandis, Hall, & Ewen, 1965). Pairs constituting one liberal and one conservative produced more creative solutions to these problems than did liberal-liberal or conservative-conservative pairings.

There is abundant evidence that viewpoint diversity can and often does lead to novel solutions to a variety of problems (Crano, 2012; Mannix & Neale, 2005), and self-identified conservatives may be more diverse with regard to their political beliefs than liberals (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Klein & Stern, 2005; Stenner, 2009). A diverse faculty enriches experiences, fosters empathy, cultivates and shares talents and perspectives, and offers unscripted opportunities to open minds and inform thinking. Unfortunately, when there is a lack of viewpoint diversity in the academy students are disadvantaged by missing non-liberal interpretations of society, ethics, and human meaning. But are there meaningful numerical differences in colleges and universities between liberal and conservative worldviews?

## LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Numerous reports have chronicled the substantial decline of conservative professors on college campuses (Abrams, 2016) and have noted a striking change regarding viewpoint diversity with liberals and progressives dominating universities. Moreover, Willick (2016) has observed that "Despite (or perhaps because of) it's almost religious reverence for racial and sexual diversity, the academy has allowed political diversity in certain quarters to wither to the point of vanishing." The rapid disappearance of the right of center leaning faculty—the "plight of conservatives" within the academy—has led to conservative professors now being characterized as members of a

"beleaguered minority" (Jeffers, 2015), and Wilkinson (2007) speaks of the "leftist death-grip in academia."

It is not that this idea has recently surfaced since Newcome (1943) found at Bennington College in the 1930s that conservative students felt isolated from the larger campus environment; Buckley lamented the preponderance of liberal thinkers in 1951 at Yale; Bloom mourned the plurality of professorial viewpoints in his 1987 best seller; Sacks and Thiel (1998) wrote how left-wing multiculturalism had hurt campuses; Horowitz (2006) sought to guarantee equal rights for conservative faculty and students; and more recently Haidt and colleagues (2015), Shields and Dunn (2016), and Etchemendy (2017) have voiced concerns about rising intellectual monocultures and ideological uniformity in higher education.

There has been a pervasive shift to the political/cultural left in higher education as indicated below in Figure 2, such that many of these institutions are now bastions of liberalism. In the 15 years between 1995 and 2010, the academy went from leaning left to being almost entirely on the left. The red line mark of 12% in 2014 is primarily made up of professors in schools of engineering, health sciences, business, and agriculture; the percent conservative for the humanities and social science departments is closer to 5%.

Figure 2. Data from the Higher Education Research Institute illustrates a significant leftward movement of the professoriate, based on a survey of college faculty members conducted every other year since 1989 and posted in the Heterodox Academy (Haidt et al., 2015).


A study by UCLA's Higher Education Research Institute (Eagan, Stolzenberg, Lozano, Aragon, Suchard, & Hurtado, 2014) found that all undergraduate faculty nationwide, 59.8 percent identify as far left or liberal, compared with far right or conservative at 12.8 percent. Egan et al. (2014) found that 14.6 percent of faculty members identifying as far left at private research universities as the most left-leaning, and only 0.3 percent as far right. The most significant

conservative contingent can be found at religious, non-Roman Catholic four-year colleges where 22.4 percent identify as conservative and another 1.3 percent say that they are far right. In the South and throughout the Great Plains, the ratio of liberal to conservative professors hovers around 3 to 1. On the west coast, the ratio was 6 to 1, and in elite universities in New England liberal professors outnumbered conservatives 28-to-1, up from a 5-to-1 ratio in 1989 (Walker, 2016). This evolution from the center may be problematic for non-liberals since Ivy League universities set the trend for America's other schools.

In a study by Duarte et al. (2015), 58-66 percent of social science professors identified as liberal, while only 5-8 percent identified as conservatives. Figure 3 taken from Klein and Stern (2005) illustrates this dramatic difference. This decades-long shift to the left is endemic, and as students influenced by their liberal professors became graduate assistants, then faculty members, liberalism became further entrenched in higher education. On the other hand, Smith, Mayer, & Fritschler (2008) in their book, *Closed Minds? : Politics and ideology in American Universities* argue that students' worldview is primarily influenced by their peers, rather than faculty members (p. 207). Gross and Simmons (2006) further found that only about 1/5 of self-identified Republican college students say they do not feel comfortable discussing their political views on campus. This seems a relatively low number if freedom of speech is indeed being suppressed on campus (p. 77).

Figure 3. Illustration of political bias adapted from Klein and Stern (2005, p. 264).

This trend toward liberal political orthodoxy has made U.S. universities captive to a narrow ideology seemingly out of touch with mainstream America (Jensen, 2017; Smith, Mayer, & Fritschler, 2008). Gallup data since 1992 (see Figure 4) have found self-identified conservatives have long made up about 40 percent of the American public. Self-identified liberals have made up about 20 percent although recently the percent of liberals is 25 and the percent of conservatives is 36 (Saad, 2017). These numbers suggest that the academy is not representative of American society and potentially making it more difficult for public universities to secure funding. The proposed Coburn Amendment, for example, would have placed severe limits on political scientists' access to federal funding but did not make it into the 2014 spending bill (Mervis, 2014).

Similarly, in March 2014, the U. S. House Science, Space, and Technology' Subcommittee introduced a bill which proposed $150 million in cuts in National Science Foundation funding to social and behavioral sciences but, once again, it did not make it into the final bill.

Figure 4. American's Self-Identified Political Ideology. Adapted from Gallup Data (Saad, 2017).

These legislative initiatives may be a harbinger of things to come, and the academy must be sensitive to political threats to social science funding. Moreover, many ordinary citizens may come to view the liberal elites in higher education as inconsistent with the values of contemporary America and to have little experience of the real world and therefore make them irrelevant (Bartholomew, 2017). Furthermore, this imbalance gives rise to suspicions regarding universities' ability to make students more capable people and citizens and harms them by limiting the depth and range of ideas to which they are exposed. In support of this view, is a current Pew Research Center study (2017) finding that while a majority of the American public (55 percent) continues to say that colleges and universities have a positive effect on the country, a majority of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents (58 percent) now say that colleges and universities have a negative effect on the country, up from 45 percent in 2016. By comparison, 72 percent of Democrats and those who lean Democrat, believe colleges and universities have a positive effect. This represents little change from recent years.

Duarte et al. (2015) and others (e.g., Gross, 2013) point out that the underrepresentation of conservatives in today's academy may negatively impact students' inclination to enter the professoriate because they see it as unwelcoming. And sometimes professors express outright contempt for conservative views, which aside from being discourteous, lowers professors' credibility with level-headed individuals across a wide range of political views and motivates students to go elsewhere (Nisbett, 2015). It appears that some liberal professors may be drawing their inspiration from Saul Alinsky's (1971) motto that "ridicule is man's most potent weapon" (p. 128). Thus, conservatives are often viewed as pariahs and students recognize this early on in their undergraduate and graduate studies, and this will likely encourage those who do not share the majority ideology to choose a different vocation. Bloom (2011) noted, "Nobody wants to be part of a community where their identity is the target of ridicule and malice." Perhaps, also, the

academy is just not of interest to conservatives today. While this is possible, we are unsure how this may account for the somewhat sudden shift in the conservatives entering higher education. Self-selection plays a role in the overrepresentation of liberals in colleges and universities and contributes to the political homogeneity of the academy but so do other factors outlined below.

It should be noted, however, that politics is not always an issue in the classroom. Depending somewhat on the subject matter, many faculty members provide instruction without political discussion. Gross & Simmons (2006), in particular, found that engineering professors tended to focus on the subject area rather than engage in political discussion. Shields & Dunn (2016) in *Passing on the Right*, found in their research that students were more likely to be influenced by their peers on campus, rather than indoctrinated by faculty members at the university.

COSTS OF A HOMOGENEOUS LIBERAL CULTURE

Many people recognize that people loathe ideas that conflict with their own and judge less positively others who are dissimilar in some way from themselves (e.g., Byrne, 1969; McGregor, Lieberman, Solomon, Greenberg, Arndt, et al., 1998), and so engage in a variety of strategies to maintain their worldview (Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Some consequences include a negative impact on pedagogical issues, motivated information processing, defense against worldview-violating groups, increased political scrutiny, creating hostile environments less flattering to conservatives, and prejudice and discrimination.

Negative impact on pedagogical issues.

Maranto, Redding, and Hess (2009) suggest that ideologically uniform views and beliefs are problematic because they: 1) limit the questions academics ask and the phenomena they study, hindering their pursuit of knowledge and their ability to serve society; 2) delegitimize academic expertise and the academy in general among large swaths of voters and policymakers making it more difficult for scholars to contribute effectively to policy debates, and harder for citizens to believe in their public educational institutions; 3) give rise to suspicions regarding universities' ability to make students more capable people and citizens, and harms them by "limiting the depth and range of ideas to which they are exposed"; and 4) makes universities "intellectually dull places where careerism and profit-seeking" prevail and the energy of contending ideas is absent; for example, such topics as separate bathrooms for the transgendered and open borders are debated in newspapers and Congress, but generally not in academia, where a single acceptable view is presumed. Coming from a different angle, Duarte et al. (2015) documented how political diversity and dissent would improve "the reliability and validity of social psychological science" and prevent researchers from falling into "scientific hell, where scientific standards are clouded by political passions" (Tetlock, 1994, p. 510).

Motivated information processing and related concepts.

A family of related terms encompasses a set of similar phenomena, all of which involve people favoring their point-of-view. *Confirmation bias* refers to seeking information that confirms one's beliefs, hypotheses or expectations (e.g., Nickerson, 1998). *Myside bias* happens when

people appraise evidence or examine hypotheses in ways biased towards supporting their attitudes (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2013). *Motivated reasoning* denotes the occurrence where people often seek out evidence partial to their pre-existing views. This driven information processing—which sometimes comprises selectively attending to, ignoring, or distorting information to support existing beliefs (Kunda, 1990; Mercier & Sperber, 2011) and is neither more common among conservatives nor among liberals (Bartels, 2002; Crawford et al., 2013; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Therefore, when liberals or conservatives form impressions about social groups, they are likely to confirm their previously established beliefs regarding the group and the validity of their own ideological beliefs, and to uncritically evaluate information that confirms their prior beliefs and preferences (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998).

Defense against worldview violating groups.

The desire for a consistent worldview can also lead to intolerance against groups whose values conflict with, or threaten, one's values (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Chambers & Melnyk, 2006; Henry & Reyna, 2007; Sullivan et al., 1981). Although research regarding this topic has often focused on conservatives and other groups with whom they disagree (e.g., Reyna et al., 2006), the inclination to defend one's beliefs against worldview violating groups applies equally to conservatives and liberals. Though liberals and conservatives differ in the moral values that form the basis of their worldviews (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), both endorse moral values with similar intensity (Skitka & Bauman, 2008), indicating they will be similarly prone to defend against attacks on their worldview.

Increased political scrutiny.

The political imbalance in higher education makes some wonder if universities have been hijacked by poisonous identity politics. Such tribalism does not serve the academy well and invites governmental scrutiny and intervention. For example, Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam signed a bill recently to restore free speech and equality. The legislation makes it illegal for universities and colleges to disinvite speakers based on their political beliefs and also barred universities from charging higher fees for conservative students to host speakers under the pretense of needing increased security to protect them from mobs. In California, a Republican-sponsored bill currently being debated would end the restrictive "free speech zones" at California's public universities. Under this proposal, anyone would be able to speak freely anywhere across campus. Liberal administrators would no longer decide when and where students can speak their minds. And recently, Iowa state senator Mark Chelgren introduced a bill to require that no professor or instructor be hired by a public state university if his or her most recent party affiliation would "cause the percentage of the faculty belonging to one political party to exceed by 10 percent" the percentage of the faculty belonging to the other dominant party (Hemmer, 2017). "I'm under the understanding that right now they can hire people because of diversity," he told the *Des Moines Register*. His proposed legislation would institute a hiring freeze at state universities until the

number of registered Republicans within the faculty falls within 10 percent of registered Democrats.

Moreover, some states prohibit discrimination based on political affiliation or other political activity. These include California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, and New York. For example, the Connecticut General Statute§ 5-227 indicates that "No person in the classified service or seeking admission to it may be appointed, demoted or dismissed or be in any way favored or discriminated against because of his political opinions or affiliations or as the result of a discriminatory employment practice as defined in section 46a-51. No question in any application, questionnaire, examination or other evaluation form used in connection with carrying out the provisions of this chapter may relate to political or religious opinions or affiliations of any applicant or eligible person on any candidate or reemployment list established and maintained by the Commissioner of Administrative Services."

Fearing that criticisms of academia's liberal slant will lead politicians to impose partisan quotas or a kind of ideological affirmative action, many academics deny that colleges and universities should host a variety of viewpoints (Maranto & Woessner, 2012). In one particularly unpersuasive defense of the status quo, the liberal-leaning American Association of University Professors (AAUP) report Freedom in the Classroom (2007) argues that any attempt at ideological diversity inevitably could lead to "'equal time' for Communist totalitarianism or Nazi fascism," given the "potentially infinite number of competing perspectives." Seemingly, the left-leaning AAUP finds conservative perspectives no more (or less) plausible than those doctrines of Stalin or Hitler (AAUP, 2007).

Mitigating a standardized left-wing political view intent on redirecting higher education into political activism with an overemphasis on the trilogy of race, class, and gender may lead to U.S. citizens taking academic perspectives more seriously. This is important because today's higher education appears out of step with mainstream America where there is often ridicule and disdain of the academy and their endorsement of heavy unionization, comprehensive regulation, high taxes, free-flowing welfare, universal healthcare, lax policing, open borders, a passive military posture, etc. "It's ineffably sad that today 'that's academic' often means 'that's irrelevant'" (Kristol, 2016a). Such continued scorn could translate into decreased state and federal aid and support.

Hostile climate.

Historically, universities and colleges provided an open exchange of ideas, devoid of disparaging remarks about people with different viewpoints but when nearly everyone in a field shares the same political orientation, certain ideas become the accepted view, dissent is discouraged, errors can go unopposed, and discrimination occurs. Those with opposing views are labeled as evil or ignorant or stupid, rather than as individuals with beliefs worthy of consideration. Where freedom of speech and expression were once inviolable, today liberalism employs speech codes, trigger warnings, *ad hominem* attacks, boycotts, and shaming rituals to stifle freedom of thought, expression, and action. Moreover, the liberal academy has been so focused on attaining diversity by race and gender (undoubtedly valuable) perhaps they were unaware that they were creating a hostile climate for people who *think* differently.

This has manifested itself in liberals' research agendas which often denigrates conservatives. For example, compared to liberals, conservatives are less intelligent (Hodson & Busseri, 2012), less cognitively complex (Jost et al., 2003), more simple-minded (Conway et al., 2016), and prone to engage in low-effort thought processing (Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012). They are more rigid, dogmatic, and inflexible (Jost et al., 2003). Conservatives are often prone to expedient, closed-minded, and authoritarian solutions (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Kruglanski, 2004; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). Their lower IQ explains conservatives' racism and sexism (Deary, Batty, & Gale, 2008), and their support for inequality could explain why they are happier than liberals (Napier & Jost, 2008). They are hyper-responsive to threatening and negative stimuli (Oxley et al., 2008), and they adopt their political beliefs to soften their fears and concerns (Jost et al., 2003). Inbar and Lammers (2012) asked psychologists "Do you feel that there is a hostile climate towards your political beliefs in your field?" Of 17 conservatives, 14 (82%) responded "yes," while 18 of 266 liberals (7%) responded "yes." Such research may be nothing more than liberal academics trying to legitimize their prejudices against conservatives. This hostile climate toward conservatives provides a straightforward explanation why conservatives hide their political opinions from colleagues. Academics rely on the opinions of their colleagues—who judge their papers, grants, and applications for teaching positions—and as judgments are typically made by multiple reviewers (most of whom are liberal), outspoken conservatives encounter an extremely serious problem. Hence, the more conservative respondents are, the more they hide their political opinions.

In another arena, Inbar and Lammers (2015) observed that professional talks (in psychology) often contain jokes disparaging Republican politicians (and only Republicans), and speakers sometimes openly mock conservative beliefs. Such conduct in a professional setting can alienate colleagues who do not share the majority's political beliefs. This behavior sends a signal to both students and novice researchers that there is only one acceptable political ideology in the field. Indeed, Birmingham (2017) noted that "Junior faculty play it safe—conceptually, politically, and formally—because they write for job and tenure committees rather than for readers." Publications serve careers before they serve culture.

Prejudice and Discrimination.

Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) define discrimination as "an ingroup's subjectively justified unequal, usually disadvantageous, evaluation or treatment of an outgroup, that the latter (or an outside observer) would deem unjustified" (p. 159). Thus, the well-known psychological principle of in-group favoritism (Allport, 1954), sometimes known as in-group–out-group bias, in-group bias, or intergroup bias, which is a pattern of favoring members of one's in-group over out-group members and denigrating others who do not fit into those groups may account for discrimination.

In fact, in-group favoritism occurs frequently and on such trivial things as whether people "overestimate" or "underestimate" the number of dots shown on a display (Billig & Tajfel, 1973), on the basis of a completely random coin toss (Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980), or t-shirt color (Bigler, Brown, & Markell, 2001). One of the most significant studies on ingroup-outgroup bias was performed in the schoolroom of an Iowa teacher, Jane Elliot. On the day following the

assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968, Elliot decided to address the problems of racial prejudice by dividing her third-grade class into groups based on eye color. As profiled in the PBS Frontline Documentary, "A Class Divided" (Peters, 1985), Elliot showed how easy it was to transform the 7-year-old students in her class into bigots by making the brown-eyed children the targets of discrimination by the "better" blue-eyed children. In only a matter of minutes, the "superior" blue-eyed children began ridiculing their classmates, calling them "stupid" and shunning them in the playground during recess. Then she reversed the situation and showed that the brown-eyed children when on top, exacted the same punishments onto their blue-eyed classmates. Brandt et al. (2014) found a similar outcome, not with different eye colors but with opposing ideologies: *both* liberals and conservatives were willing to express animus and engage in discriminatory behavior toward those whose values and goals conflict with their own, and at virtually identical levels (Brandt et al., 2014). Dissimilarity breeds discrimination.

It seems then that viewpoint diversity about political attitudes may lead to prejudice and discrimination against non-liberal groups who may represent new, potentially threatening views. The outgroup in higher education are the non-liberal colleagues and applicants and research suggests that discrimination exists in hiring, promotions, and terminations. Additionally, the literature on political prejudice demonstrates that strongly identified partisans show little compunction about expressing their obvious hostility toward the opposing side (e.g., Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013; Crawford & Pilanski 2014; Haidt, 2012). Partisans routinely believe that their hostility towards opposing groups is justified because of the threat posed to their values by dissimilar others (for a review, see Brandt et al., 2014).

If left unchecked, an academic field can become a cohesive moral community, creating a shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996) that blinds its members to other interpretations. While choosing like-minded people may be a natural human behavior, it often results in discrimination. According to Klein, "Once you get a department above 50 percent (in ideology), they'll tend to keep people out who oppose them. So, it'll tend to go from 50 to 60 to 70 to 80 percent …" (Watson, 2014), and when people are largely interact with like-minded others their views become more extreme (Lamm & Myers, 1978). Such numbers often generate prejudice and discrimination which can be expressed in evaluation of others, promotional decisions, in the allocation of resources and hiring.

In hiring a new member of an academic department, most existing members will tend to support candidates with common values, beliefs, and commitments. Once a majority of decision makers see the world a particular way, they are more likely to eliminate those who are not like them in favor of those who are. Data from a variety of independent and diverse samples have revealed that intolerance knows no ideological bounds and that both liberals and conservatives express intolerance toward groups with whom they disagree (Lambert & Chasteen, 1997; McClosky & Chong, 1985; Yancey, 2010), make negative attributions for groups whose values are inconsistent with their own (Chambers et al., 2013; Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002), and distance themselves from people who do not share their moral convictions (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Given what is known about the psychological tendency to favor arguments that support individuals' preexisting beliefs (Kunda 1990), concerns about political bias in the hiring process may be warranted.

In *Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia* (1995), the Court found viewpoint discrimination occurred when the university refused to provide funding for a student religious newspaper when it funded secular student communication forums, which the court found to be in violation of free speech. The political motivations that lead to the de-recognition of religious groups also robbed students of the chance to learn about the beliefs of different religions. The Supreme Court found the university's actions to be impermissible viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that "The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction" (p. 828-829). Viewpoint discrimination occurs when entities (e.g., universities, the government) deny a speaker access to a forum "solely to suppress the point of view he [sic] espouses on an otherwise includible subject" (*Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.*, 1985, p. 3451).

In *Rosenberger,* the Court classified the university's actions as viewpoint discrimination because the university did not exclude religion as a subject matter, but instead disfavored student journalism with a religious viewpoint. Viewpoint neutrality is the requirement that the government does not favor one speaker's message over another's regarding the same topic (*Flint v. Dennison*, 2007). Viewpoint is discerned by reference to opinion or ideology. Viewpoint discrimination is seldom permitted and is routinely subjected to the strictest standards of scrutiny.

Experimental field research has demonstrated bias against studies that contradict liberal progressive beliefs. Abramowitz, Gomes, and Abramowitz (1975) asked research psychologists to rate the suitability of a manuscript for publication. Identical methods and analyses were employed for every reviewer; however, the result was experimentally varied between subjects to imply that either a group of left-wing political activists on a college campus was mentally healthier–or that they were less healthy–than a comparison group of non-activists. When the leftist activists were said to be healthier, the more liberal reviewers rated the manuscript as more likely publishable, the statistical analyses more sufficient, than when the otherwise identical manuscript reported the activists less mentally healthy. The less liberal reviewers showed no such bias. Likewise, a study by Iyengar and Westwood (2015) underscored how powerful political bias could be. In an experiment, Democrats and Republicans were asked to choose a scholarship winner from among (fictitious) finalists, with the experiment tweaked so that applicants sometimes included the president of the Democratic or Republican club, while varying the credentials and race of each. Four-fifths of Democrats and Republicans alike chose a student of their party to win a scholarship, and discrimination against people of the other party was much greater than discrimination based on race. Such partisanship in education has increased substantially over the past four decades (Haidt & Hetherington, 2012; Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes 2012).

Ceci, Peters, and Plotkin (1985) found a similar pattern. Research proposals hypothesizing either "reverse discrimination" (i.e., against White males) or conventional discrimination (i.e., against ethnic minorities) were submitted for evaluation to 150 Internal Review Boards. Everything else about the proposals was held constant. The "reverse discrimination" proposals were less likely to be approved than conventional discrimination proposals. In these two field studies (Abramowitz et al., 1975; Ceci et al., 1985), the discrimination may well have been unconscious or unintentional. Inbar and Lammers (2012) found hostility toward and willingness

to discriminate against conservatives is widespread among social and personality psychologists. One in six respondents surveyed reported being somewhat (or more) inclined to discriminate against conservatives with regard to inviting them for symposia or for reviewing their work. One in four would discriminate in reviewing their grant applications. More than one-third would discriminate against conservatives when making hiring decisions. The more liberal respondents were, the more they said they would discriminate. In a replication and extension of this research Honeycutt and Freberg (2017) found similar patterns of in-group/out-group bias that characterized *both* self-reported liberals and conservatives across a wider variety of academic disciplines but this seems particularly problematic for conservatives because their small numbers do not enable them to act upon their willingness to discriminate. Considering the substantial majority of liberals on the faculty and the explicitly expressed willingness on the part of a sizable minority to make political ideology a deciding factor in hiring, it is likely the number of political conservatives on campus will continue to shrink. Thus, willingness to discriminate is not limited to small decisions and is strongest regarding important decisions, for example, faculty hiring, and grant applications. The combination of basic research demonstrating high degrees of hostility towards opposing partisans, the field studies demonstrating discrimination against research projects that are unflattering to liberals and their views, and survey results of engaging in political discrimination all point to the same conclusion: discrimination is a reality. Maranto and Woessner (2012) go so far as to suggest that conservatives should bypass impenetrable islands of leftism (e.g., sociology, social work, women's studies, and ethnic studies) that may be impervious to outside perspectives because they openly advocate a distinctly ideological worldview.

Another way discrimination can be shown the concept of *disparate impact* which involves an apparently neutral employment practice (e.g., an interview; tenure decision) that disproportionately excludes certain categories of people (see *Griggs v. Duke Power Company*, 1971); for example, setting a height requirement of 6 feet to become a professor might be fair in form because the requirement is applied to all candidates, but discriminatory in operation since such a requirement would tend to excessively reject Hispanics, Asians, and women who are genetically shorter in stature when compared to Whites or Blacks. Although traditionally used for examining differences based on a person's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability status, if it could be shown that such a practice (or practices) unintentionally discriminates against those holding non-liberal perspectives in a college or university setting then illegal viewpoint discrimination could be demonstrated. Such a charge could be buttressed by showing that a significant imbalance in political interpretations is present in a department. In *Teamsters v. United States* (1977), the case was based in large part on pervasive statistical evidence, and the Court indicated that statistics could be used to make a *prima facie* case of discrimination and that significant under representations were often a tell-tale sign of purposeful discrimination. Although disparate impact cases typically involve Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (1964 as amended), it might also be shown to be discrimination based on violations of the First Amendment. The *Griggs* case has significance for universities because of the large imbalance between liberals and conservatives in higher education (as illustrated in Figure 3) could suggest the presence of discrimination, and courts, scholars, and legislatures have more recently tackled these non-traditional forms of discrimination (Rosenberg, 2009).

RECOMMENDATIONS

The stifling homogeneity of many of today's universities means that subjective opinions and values will become universal, they will seemingly become objective truths, and the idea that anyone might view something differently—and be justified in doing so—is alien and threatening. Rising political polarization is escalating an "us versus them" attitude that motivates people to accept the most negative version of the opposing side's viewpoints and the most flattering version of their own. These views are misleading and counterproductive, especially within universities where the clash of ideas could be so conducive to learning and growth and where the free exchange of ideas is their *raison d'etre*.

We do not advocate for the views of bigots, rapists, or pedophiles in academic institutions, nor perspectives where there is so much evidence in support of them that it would be perverse to believe otherwise. For example, geologists are not obliged to accept colleagues who believe the earth is flat but can be challenged and questioned civilly. But political or moral beliefs often do not have a truth value. A belief that the earth is flat is factually false; a belief that abortion should be prohibited is not. It may also be that many aspects of conservative thinking can serve as inspiration for interesting research questions that would otherwise be missed. Finally, some ideas become widely accepted, perhaps entrenched, without significant evidence. Such entrenched beliefs often arise because they support particular political or moral agendas; if the beliefs are falsified, the moral beliefs will be threatened and thus questioning such perspectives can be threatening to those who hold them. We support the view of former sociologist and New York Democratic Senator, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who pointed out that "Everyone is entitled to their own opinions, but they are not entitled to their facts."

Jacques Mallet du Pan, the political journalist and supporter of the French Royalist cause in the French Revolution, summarized the typical fate of extremists: "the Revolution devours its children" (1793/2002, p. 113), suggesting that individuals participating in leading a revolution sometimes are the ones badly affected by it. The liberal college professors of today were the radical students of the 1960s and 1970s, who protested "the man" and bucked authority. One of the reasons college faculty members and administrators fail to stand up to student demands today is that they once wore those shoes. Thus, in this sense, the revolution devours its children. This would be enormously unfortunate since good people in higher education may be hurt by a backlash suggested by du Pan's observation.

We would like to think that there is a simple solution to the problems the academy faces today regarding viewpoint diversity and viewpoint discrimination. Things can be done. However, that will incrementally change higher education for the better. A beginning point might be to acknowledge the problem and raise awareness about it. Viewpoint diversity can be increased almost overnight by inviting speakers from a wide range of perspectives—political, economic, and ideological—even when considered offensive to faculty members and students. Seek feedback from non-liberals. Expand institutional diversity statements to include politics. Faculty could add a statement to their academic websites acknowledging that they encourage collaboration among people of diverse political views. Eliminate pejorative terms referring to non-liberals and criticize others' scholarship when they use those terms. As an editor or reviewer, do not permit such terms

to pass without comment. Support adversarial collaborations that encourage competing for ideological camps to explore the boundary conditions on each other's claims. Conservative academics need to demonstrate their commitment to Truth rather than a particular ideological viewpoint who must be willing to criticize both Republicans and Democrats on both style and substance and to do so in a calm and scholarly manner.

If the academy is already comfortable with and actively seeking to diversify its faculty by ethnicity, race, and gender, then why not by diversity of thought and opinion as well? Some have even suggested affirmative action for conservative professors to increase political pluralism in some disciplines (Haidt, 2011; Marohn, 2016). However, Smith (2015) argues against affirmative action in a way many conservatives would endorse. He argues that affirmative action type programs never perfectly cancel out bias. "If colleges and universities start giving jobs preferentially to conservatives, it seems like they could end up with a lot of low-skill conservatives. Conservative researchers might simply be ignored and disrespected, with the assumption that 'he [sic] checked the box to get in'" (Smith, 2015). This is considered a major problem with race-based affirmative action, and it seems like it would apply for political affiliation just as firmly.

Prominent social psychologist Roy Baumeister (2017) provides some possibilities that may challenge liberal progressives. He notes that social psychology used to study task performance. Today, social psychology is devoted almost entirely to studying how people think and feel. A conservative presence in the field might re-kindle attention to what makes people and organizations produce and perform well. According to Baumeister, Marxism did much better in academic theories than in practice. Many professors detest business and the people who do it, even though most of their students will work in business. Business has made American society rich enough to afford universities. Having some respected speakers and researchers to espouse pro-business views would inform and elevate how academics understand a huge part of life and culture. A second topic would be to invite speakers to campus who profess advocacy of traditional family values. Baumeister indicated that it might be good to have the conservative pro-family view represented. A third topic would be to have the academic culture include a minority viewpoint that holds a positive view of America and its traditions. Often, liberals are critical of American culture and its history, however, when compared to many other countries and historical periods, the United States is still the better place to live.

While liberals evaluate organizations based mainly on the fairness of the process, conservatives tend to look at performance outcomes. Speakers might address this difference within moral foundations theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Researchers have found that people use five sets of moral intuitions (MoralFoundations.org, n. d.):

- *Care/harm*: Relates to our evolution as mammals with attachment systems and ability to feel (and dislike) the pain of others. It underlies virtues of kindness, gentleness, and nurturance.

- *Fairness/cheating*: Relates to the evolutionary process of reciprocal altruism. It generates ideas of justice, rights, proportionality, and autonomy.

- *Loyalty/betrayal*: This foundation is related to humans' long history as tribal creatures able to form shifting coalitions. Loyalty motivates virtues of patriotism and inspires self-sacrifice. It is active anytime people feel that it's "one for all and all for one."

- ***Authority/subversion***: *This foundation was shaped by humans' long primate history of hierarchical social interactions. It underlies virtues of leadership and followership, including deference to legitimate authority and respect for traditions.*

- ***Sanctity/degradation***: *The psychology of disgust and contamination shaped this foundation. It underlies religious notions of striving to live in an elevated, less carnal, more noble way. This supports the common belief that the human body is a temple which can be desecrated by immoral activities.*

In other words, individuals are predisposed to care for others and see the harm as morally wrong. They have an innate sense of fairness and the need to reciprocate. Humans tend to display loyalty to their groups as well as identify authority figures to whom it is natural to show deference. And they have a sense of what is right and wrong to do to their bodies. Across four studies using multiple methods, Graham et al. (2009) found that liberals consistently showed greater endorsement and use of the Care/Harm and Fairness/Cheating foundations compared to the other three foundations. On the other hand, conservatives approved of and employed the five foundations more equally, often even discounting the first two when the other three were threatened. For liberals, fairness means sharing resources equally, but for conservatives, fairness means proportionality—that people should receive in return based on the level of effort they put in. In a broader sense, this research suggests that liberals tend to speak for the weak and oppressed, while conservatives speak for institutions and traditions, even at a cost to those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. It would be helpful if the academy might examine issues through the lens of these five factors.

Books and articles assigned for students to read—especially for courses in history, English literature, in addition to the humanities and social sciences—should include authors whose positions are at odds with those of most academicians and student bodies. Professors should balance *The Nation* magazine with Reason magazine, *The American Prospect* with *The American Spectator*, National Public Radio with Conservative Talk Radio programs, and PBS news with Fox News.

Viewpoint diversity, however, is subservient to the more profound principle of free speech, which should be applied indiscriminately across the academy. Indeed, free speech is the *sine qua non* of the academy. It is what tenure was designed to protect, and yet today some faculty and students want protection from allegedly offensive speech and disagreeable ideas and opinions—defined differently by different interest groups—demanding things such as trigger warnings, safe spaces, micro-aggressions, and speaker invitations, to discrimination in faculty hiring practices. What perhaps began as well-intentioned measures at curbing prejudices and reducing bigotry with the aim of increasing tolerance, has instead metamorphosed into thought police attempting to impose totalitarian measures that result in silencing dissent and unorthodox views of any kind. The result is the very opposite of what free speech and a college education are all about and what Nawaz (2012) calls "regressive liberalism" (p. 210), where freedom of speech and expression are sacrificed.

One of the first acts of totalitarian regimes is to restrict dissent and free speech, so perhaps it should be called totalitarian liberalism. The justification of censorship laws in the consequentialist argument that people might be incited to discrimination, hate, or violence if

exposed to such ideas fails the moment these individuals are asked: "What happens when it is *you and your* ideas that are determined to be dangerous" (Shermer, 2016)?

Universities should not restrict citizens' speech just because it finds their opinions and beliefs "political," "controversial," "offensive," "distasteful," or "hateful" because such terms are often a proxy for suppressing the ideas presented or a guise for disagreement with the views expressed by others (Heins, 1996). Respected comedians like John Cleese, Jerry Seinfeld, and Chris Rock refuse to perform on college campuses because of the thought and belief police that seem to populate American colleges and universities.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In India, there's a popular parable that tells of six blind men who argue at length about what an elephant feels like. Each has a different belief, and each persists with his interpretation. "It's like a rope," says the man who touched the tail. "Oh no, it's more like the solid branch of a tree," contends the one who touched the trunk. The discussion continues on and on. The moral of the story is that these individuals have credible understandings and they tend to focus on certain elements in supporting their judgment. Similarly, both liberal and conservative political viewpoints have something valuable to offer. It is important for the left to acknowledge that the right's emphasis on laws, institutions, customs, and religion is constructive. Conservatives recognize that democracy is a significant achievement and that maintaining the social order requires imposing constraints on people. Likewise, liberal values also serve worthwhile roles: ensuring that the rights of weaker members of society are upheld; limiting things such as pollution that corporations sometimes pass on to society; and promoting innovation by supporting different ideas and various ways of life. If the academy I could see that those they disagree with it are not immoral but simply emphasizing different moral principles as suggested by moral foundations theory (Haidt, 2012), some of the antagonism will subside, and it could be a win-win for both conservatives and liberals and, most importantly, for higher education.

Others (e.g., our adversaries) see events based on their particular individual or group experiences, their desire to project a positive image, and, among other things, their political ideology, but do not recognize that those same biases are influencing their judgments and inferences. Individuals often believe that their take on the world enjoys particular authenticity and is shared by other openminded perceivers and seekers of truth and that they see issues and events "objectively," as they are in "reality," while others do not (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002). What is needed is perhaps a dose of intellectual humility (Hoyle, Davisson, Diebels, & Leary, 2016).

Diversity is a value long-established within academia and enjoys broad support. However, political viewpoint diversity is often not welcome in American colleges and universities. Domination by researchers with a narrow outlook, moral perspective, worldview, or political perspective risks creating disciplines riddled biased viewpoints and interpretations, in addition to biased and unjustified claims and conclusions (Jussim, 2012; Prentice, 2012; Tetlock, 1994). Critics indicate that this lopsidedness in worldview results in prejudice and discrimination against non-progressives and that liberal opinions now tend to silence other viewpoints in higher education leaving some wondering how students can be well educated when they only hear one side of an argument.

We are reminded of the words of John Stuart Mill (1859, p. 31):

He who knows only his side of the case knows little of that. ... Nor is it enough that he should hear the opinions of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. He must be able to hear them from persons who Actually believe them ... He must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form.

For Mill, the adversarial system of competing ideas served democratic principles but was also was a vehicle for the finding of truths, as well as for the vitality of the positions reached. Diversity and dissent are critical values to instill and uphold, and while many individuals agree in theory, most do not in practice (Nemeth, 2012). There is a strong consensus in higher education that diversity is important. Although most discussions of diversity involve race typically, ethnicity, gender, age, and sexual orientation increasingly *viewpoint* diversity is taking center stage. Universities have traditionally been a vanguard of freedom of expression and a free exchange of ideas but today's academia seems increasingly hostile to conservatives who do not support an increasingly liberal, leftist ideology. These institutions appear to downplay the importance of diversity concerning people with different understandings, opinions, perspectives, and political beliefs regarding social, intellectual, philosophical, legal, and moral problems.

By engaging with diversity in all its forms, the academy will be able to see things from different angles and expand their perspective to better understand the full complexity of the world. Recognizing diversity across a variety of issues is essential to know the world through fresher, clearer, more well-informed eyes. Individuals' viewpoints and worldviews are often limited by what they have seen in their own lives, so when they make a sincere effort to understand how people from different backgrounds understand the world around them, they learn new modes of thinking and encounter challenging questions they may not have previously been aware of. In seeking out new perspectives, a person's resulting opinions will be stronger, they will become keener observers of the world, and they will recognize that there are always new things they can learn more about. Whatever opinions one holds now can continually be improved, updated, and amended.

Academia cannot allow selective or convenient diversity, inclusivity, and tolerance and should instead have a vested interest in alleviating all forms of discrimination and protecting the pluralistic tradition within universities. Listening and being exposed to viewpoints that differ from one's personal views can often make individuals more tolerant (Mutz, 2006), so a lack of ideological diversity in academia will only serve to reinforce intolerance and discrimination toward ideological out-groups. As scholars attempt to find truth through their research, and as faculty work to instill these truths in the minds of their students, it is imperative that "we start to recognize the courage of minority voices and the value of the open airing of competing views, and that we achieve some clear understanding of the role of trust that allows the passionate interchange to occur" (Nemeth, 2012, p. 24). A good starting place would be with the conservative (or non-liberal) minority in academia.

In *Passing on the Right*, Shields and Dunn argue that the solution might not be in the faculty hiring process, but rather before (2016). Shields and Dunn (2016) offer a couple of solutions. First, that universities could attract more conservative scholars by advertising for positions that could be

more appealing to them, for example, rather than history perhaps military history or political history. Second, as the University of Colorado has already done, provide appointments for visiting professors in conservative thought.

Nemeth and colleagues (e.g., Nemeth, 2012; Nemeth & Staw, 1989) in what has become known as minority influence theory provide some empirical support for Mill's assertions. They have repeatedly shown the value of minority views and dissent, not merely for its truth or persuasiveness, but rather for the thought that it stimulates. While dissent stimulates creativity and a broad range of thought and ideas, majority views tend to stimulate convergent thinking. People focus on the issue from the perspective of the majority and narrow the range of considerations, often convincing themselves of the majority positions. "Dissenters, rather than rogues or obstacles, provide value: they liberate people to say what they believe, and they stimulate divergent and creative thought *even when they are wrong*" (Nemeth, 2012, p. 362, italics in original). Heterogeneity, especially when it involves differing perspectives or viewpoints, improves decision making. Minority viewpoints appear to be important in creating cultures of innovation.

As the academy becomes more homogenous, however, dissent will likely decline, and many conservative professors feel closeted and identify with the experience of many gays and lesbians who in the past had to hide who they are (Shields & Dunn, 2016). Liberals and conservatives need to rethink the place of conservatives in academia. Liberals might consider the idea that conservative professors are rarely combatants in a right-wing war against universities. Likewise, conservatives should curb its war against higher education, especially since it inadvertently helps cement progressives' troubled rule over academia.

In summary, it should be noted that many of the observations here apply to full-time tenured (or tenure-track) faculty. It would be important to note whether these remarks also apply to adjunct faculty members who are significantly increased in number in higher education as colleges and universities employ them to reduce labor costs. Birmingham (2017) notes that "Part-time adjuncts are now the majority of the professoriate and its fastest-growing segment. From 1975 to 2011, the number of part-time adjuncts quadrupled," with many teaching classes at multiple institutions. A Congressional study in 2014 that found that "89 percent of adjuncts work at one or more institution; 13 percent work at four or more …. [and] adjuncts' median pay per course is $2700." We believe that given the increasing numbers of adjunct faculty in the academy that assessing their viewpoint diversity would be a fruitful endeavor.

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